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RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF RE: CROSS-APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because Wright appealed and Defendant cross-appealed, a
statement concerning the briefing process is in order, and of
some

significance.

When

Humphries

filed

his

brief

as

Respondent, he addressed matters raised in Appellant's brief
and included arguments concerning his cross-appeal.

Wright

thereafter filed what is captioned as a Reply Brief but Wright
did

not

reply

to

matters

raised

by

Humphries

(as

the

Respondent) that challenged the substance of the issues raised
by Wright on his appeal.

Rather, Wright's reply brief only

addresses matters raised by Humphries' cross-appeal.

There-

fore, this brief addresses only matters addressed in Wright's
reply brief concerning the cross-appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even though the jury found that Humphries breached the
agreements between the parties, the jury still found that
Wright was obligated to pay Humpheries $15,000 due under the
Management Agreement, calculated at $2,500 per month for 6
months.

The evidence supports such a finding by the jury and

it was therefore improper for the Trial Court to take away the
jury's verdict.
Humphries does not contend he is entitled to additional
pre-judgment

interest on the $30,000 promissory

note, but

rather to have this Court direct the Trial Court to award
Humphries interest post-judgment in accordance with the rate
of

interest

stated

in

the

$30,000

promissory

note,

and

likewise award him indemnification against Wright in the event
Humphries is forced to pay additional amounts as attorneys
fees if collection of the note is pursued by Zions First
National Bank.
Humphries is clearly entitled to pre-judgment interest on
the amount awarded him for fraud.

The parties bargained and

agreed to exchange assets having equal value, with the value
fixed

on

Agreement
properties

October
is

silent

4th,
as

1985.
to

the

Even
value

though
of

the
the

Purchase
respective

to be exchanged, the jury found that both Wright

and Humphries expected to receive an asset having $90,000 in
value at the time of the exchange, to-wit, October 4th, 1985.

Any difference in value should therefore bear interest from
the date of the exchange.
POINT I
ASSUMING WRIGHT WAS JUSTIFIED
IN TERMINATING
HUMPHRIES, HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED FULL CREDIT FOR
DAMAGES HE SUFFERED BY HUMPHRIES1 MISCONDUCT.
Assuming

for argument purposes that because Humphries

acted inconsistent with the terms of the agreement, Wright was
entitled

to

fire

him,

what

the

Trial

Court

failed

to

acknowledge and likewise what Wright fails to address in his
reply brief is that Wright has been fully compensated for the
sums the jury found Humphries had spent from his employer's
account without authorization.
Humphries

wrongfully

spent

All of the sums the jury found
have

been

ultimate verdict in favor of Humphries.

deducted

from

the

Wright has therefore

been made "whole" for any wrongful conduct on the part of
Humphries, and it was clearly the jury's intent to likewise
make Humphries "whole" because he was wrongfully terminated by
Wright.

To arrive at the net judgment in favor of Humphries,

the Trial Court adopted the findings of the trier of fact
to who

owed

how much

and made

those

adjustments

as

in the

Judgment on the Verdict.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court ordered the
jury verdict entered, and only pursuant to Wright's Motion for
a New Trial or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, did the Court take away the verdict in favor of

Humphries for $15,000.

The record clearly supports that a

Judgment NOV was granted by the Trial Court as compared to
some other ruling by the Court concerning the $15,000 awarded
to Humphries.

Therefore, the Trial Court committed error in

ruling that Wright was justified when he fired Humphries as
manager when in fact, the jury rejected Wright's argument of
justification and found in favor of Humphries.
POINT II
HUMPHRIES DOES NOT SEEK ADDITIONAL PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST ON THE $30,000 PROMISSORY NOTE
Humphries admits that he was in fact awarded pre-judgment
interest on the $30,000 promissory note at the rate specified
in

the

note.

Counsel

for

Wright

correctly

states

that

Humphries was awarded unpaid interest on the $30,000 note in
the sum of $7,305.21, which was the amount that had accrued at
the time of trial and was based on the testimony of an officer
for Zions First National Bank.
Humphries only seeks to have this Court direct the Trial
Court

to

award

him

indemnification

post-judgment

for

any

interest he has to pay on the note that Wright was ordered to
pay.

If

it

was

proper

to

award

Humphries

pre-judgment

interest in accordance with the terms of the note, it only
follows

that Humphries

should

be

indemnified

at the

same

interest rate post-judgment.
Contrary to Wrightfs statement on page 6 of his Reply
Brief, Humphries does not ask this Court to award him pre-

judgment interest on top of the $37,305.21 awarded him at the
time of trial.

Humphries only seeks to be totally indemnified

by Wright for the note he signed on behalf of Wright, and
nothing more.
Likewise, Humphries only seeks to have this Court direct
the Trial Court to indemnify him in the event he has to pay
attorney's

fees that the holder of the note, Zions First

National Bank, incurs if it is required to seek collection of
the note.

Admittedly, this may

occur

at

a

future time.

Humphries is entitled to be made whole for attorney's fees he
may have to pay because even though Wright has been ordered to
pay the note, he may not do so.

To hold otherwise, will not

totally indemnify Humphries on all sums he may have to pay on
a note he signed on behalf of his employer and pursuant to the
Management Agreement.
POINT III
UNLESS HUMPHRIES IS AWARDED PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON
HIS FRAUD CLAIM, WRIGHT WILL BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
The Purchase Agreement does not establish the value of
the

assets

the

parties

agreed

to

exchange.

Humphries'

testimony, which the jury adopted, was that since Humphries
believed and represented to Wright that the nursery had a
value of at least $90,000, that he (Humphries) was likewise
entitled to receive an asset having an equal value when he
sold the nursery.

For purposes of assessing damages, the jury used $90,000
as what Wright represented the Ogden property to be worth.

To

determine fair market value of the Ogden property, the jury
chose to adopt what the property actually

sold for a few

months prior to trial and awarded damages for the difference
in those two values, therefore finding that on October 4th,
1985, Humphries should have received an asset having a value
of $90,00 0.

Since Humphries did not receive that value, but

rather property having a value of $51,418, he will not be
awarded what he bargained for unless he receives pre-judgment
interest on the damages arising from the fraud.

In other

words, Humphries did not have the use of the difference in the
values of the assets exchanged, to-wit, interest on the sum of
$38,582.

That amount should bear interest from the date of

the exchange, not the date of the judgment as the Trial Court
ruled.
Wright quotes on page 7 of his reply brief the Trial
Court's statement that there was considerable dispute in the
evidence about what the value was at any given time and that
it would be difficult to go back and award interest based on
some unspecified figure from the past.

The Trial Court simply

missed the point in forming that conclusion.

The date on

which the parties exchanged assets is a date certain with
absolutely no speculative nature.

If the date of the exchange

is not used as the date when interest starts, a party is

penalized

who

has

been

defrauded,

who

cannot

sell

the

property, and who cannot get his day in court for two or three
years.
Finally, contrary to the Court's statement, Les Froerer,
the appraiser called by Humphries, testified that on October
4th, 1985, the Ogden property had a certain value to-wit:
$35,000.

However, the jury elected to use as the value of the

Ogden property its recent sales price, essentially rejecting
the values given by Froerer

and the values given by the

appraiser called by Wright, Wib Cook.

For the Trial Court to

hold that interest does not accrue on the amount of damages
arising from the fraud because the jury elects to use the
sales price of the property for purposes of computing damages
serves

to penalize

a

litigant who

tries

to mitigate his

damages by getting the best price for the property, a decision
which may require him to wait for the best time to sell the
property as Humphries did in this case.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reinstate the $15,000 awarded Humphries
for wrongful termination, award him pre-judgment interest on
the damages he suffered by Wright's fraudulent misrepresentations, and also direct the Trial Court to totally indemnify
Humphries on the $30,000 promissory note.

This Court should

therefore direct the Trial Court to recognize that in the
event Humphries has to pay Zions First National Bank interest

at the contract rate and attorney's fees Zions will incur when
it

files

suit, that Humphries

should

be

against Wright for all of those amounts.

awarded

judgment

To hold otherwise

will not totally indemnify Humphries.
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